Exactly seven years from yesterday (still today to some), early in the morning on September 11, 2001, nineteen hijackers took control of four commercial airliners en route to San Francisco and Los Angeles from Boston, Newark, and Washington, D.C. The hijackers flew two of the airliners, American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175, into the North and South Towers of the World Trade Center. Another group of hijackers flew American Airlines Flight 77 into the Pentagon. A fourth flight, United Airlines Flight 93, whose ultimate target was either the United States Capitol or White House, crashed near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. The rest, as we say, is history.

What 9/11 was to the West, ‘the’ tsunami was to the South. Caught unaware, more than 225,000 lives in eleven countries were lost on that fateful Boxing Day of 2004 by a tsunami caused as a result of an earthquake with that reached 9.1 in the Richter scale, with an epicentre off the west coast of Sumatra. Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, and Thailand were the hardest hit.

The two were different. The tsunami was a natural disaster and 9/11 was man-made. 9/11 events took 3,000 lives – and tsunami nearly 75 times of that. The tsunami did not create a recession as in the aftermath of 9/11 though the misery that it caused to millions of families and individuals in Asia was immeasurable.

They were similar. Both were universal tragedies that had an impact far beyond national boundaries. Both were turning points of modern human history. Both made the entire world stand still with utter shock and grief.

Then the inevitable questions: Can we let these repeat? Can Homo sapiens think of their common future in the blue planet if they are not ready to face the increasing threat from disasters – be they natural or man-made? What can WE do? What can I do?

What LIRNEasia did can be best presented in the words of International Development Research Centre (IDRC) in one of their electronic newsletters entitled ‘Research that matters’:

IDRC’s lead research partner was LIRNEasia, a non-profit organization that aims to improve the lives of Asia’s people by using information and communication technologies (ICTs). LIRNEasia has had considerable experience on the use of ICTs in disaster situations. The project also drew upon the extensive networking resources of Sarvodaya, a large village-based self-help movement in Sri Lanka, and upon the disaster communication expertise of Buddhi Weerasinghe of TVE Asia Pacific, Peter Anderson of Simon Fraser University, and Gordon Gow of the University of Alberta, among other partners.

The pilot study had two broad objectives. First, it sought to evaluate the suitability of various configurations of five technical systems, each with unique capabilities, for reaching Sri Lankan local leaders in an emergency: (a) a stand-alone “remote alarm device” incorporating a radio, siren, and flashing lights; (b) versatile Java-enabled mobile phones set up to receive text alerts in English, Sinhala, and Tamil; (c) “addressable” satellite radio sets capable of remote activation and of issuing targeted messages to vulnerable areas; (d) a warning system based on Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) satellite technology that delivers pop-up screen alerts to personal computers; and (e) conventional fixed wireless telephones linked to the public network.

These options were tested for reliability under varying conditions, reaction time, bidirectionality (so that alerts can be confirmed and false warnings minimized), and degree of integration into daily life.

This last-mile system aims to complement and “amplify” the Sri Lankan government’s national alerting function, rather than to issue official public warnings. Project leaders hope that if they can demonstrate an efficient lastmile mechanism, the government will adopt it.

This goal may be advanced by pressure from Sri Lanka’s coastal villagers themselves. The project’s training exercises heightened their awareness of the importance of disaster preparedness, and many communities have demanded that such programs be continued and expanded. Many of the Sarvodaya villages have started emergency response committees to strengthen local disaster resilience.

Meanwhile, the technology and the training have been tested in an actual emergency situation. In September 2007 an earthquake triggered a government order for coastal areas to evacuate ahead of a possible tsunami. Most villages did so, but at least one community — thanks to links with the Colombo hub by satellite radio and Java-enabled phones — decided instead to monitor the situation. The emergency response coordinators observed the ocean before mobilizing the people to flee. In the end, the tsunami did not happen. The government order had been an overreaction, and so the system served to avoid a costly and needless evacuation.

This multi-faceted research endeavour has drawn attention to the many technical and people-centred problems that must be confronted if such hazard alert systems are to work.

(Full document can be downloaded from here or available at the IDRC site here.)

We know that research per se will not prevent the recurrence of 9/11 or a tsunami disaster. Still, we believe will help by allowing us to be more prepared. We are happy that we completed this research. And we are happy that our efforts have been recognized.

Also in Indonesia, a dramatic drill simulating a tsunami strike was held in Java’s coastal province of Banten involving around 9,000 residents, local television reported.

The simulation, designed to test a tsunami warning system gradually being rolled out, saw hundreds of students, along with residents clutching children, rush to higher ground assailed by wailing sirens.

“This country is vulnerable to tsunami threats. Let us pray to God for this country to be kept safe from tsunamis,” President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono said after observing the exercise.

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Sarvodaya, Sri Lanka’s largest community-based organisation, and LIRNEasia, a regional ICT policy think-tank, collaborated on a 32-village pilot project that sought to identify the best technologies for reaching villages; to identify the significance of organisational strength and training for risk reduction; and to assess the participation of women in these activities.The community-based approach implemented in the project is different from a public-warning approach, but has lessons for government communications with first responders and for community organisation and training as well.

For example, the project field tested addressable and remotely activated satellite radios that have coverage over the entire Bay of Bengal region. Other equipment deployed included Java and Symbion enabled mobile handsets capable of generating loud alarms and multi-language alert messages.

The Bangladesh Network Office for Urban Safety (BNUS) of the Department of Civil Engineering, Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET) is co-organising a workshop with LIRNEasia entitled “Sharing Knowledge on Disaster Warning: Community-based Last Mile Warning Systems” to discuss the findings of the Last Mile Hazard Warning System (Hazinfo) Pilot Project as well as share the lessons of community-based last mile warning systems in Bangladesh.

The workshop is part of a series of dissemination workshops that aims to gather experts, community volunteers and community organisations involved in early warning activities from the South Asian Region.

This workshop will be held at ITN Centre, Buet on October 25.

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Addressable satellite radio sets were found to be the best alerting technology of the community disaster warning pilot project conducted by LIRNEasia and Sarvodaya. Java enabled mobile phones which has a wake up siren came next. The GSM based remote alarm device developed locally by Dialog Telekom, MicroImage and University of Moratuwa followed closely. It has both light and siren.Findings of this project on learning how information-communication technologies and community based training can help in tsunami and other disaster situations had been discussed by community leaders and international experts at a workshop on “Sharing Knowledge on Disaster Warning with a Focus on Community-Based Last-Mile Warning Systems” at the Sarvodaya Headquarters in Moratuwa recently. Difficulties had been experienced in communicating disaster warning to villages when mobile and fixed CDMA telecom networks were not functioning in conflict conditions. Also, the importance of not leaving newspapers on top of sensitive electronic equipment which can overheat and shutdown had been noted. The VSAT based warning system had not run well in the tests.

“This is proto-type technology, using chosen groups to alert particular communities in particular villages,” explained Prof. Rohan Samarajiva, Executive Director, LIRNEasia, at the press conference held on Friday at the Institute for Construction Training and Development (ICTAD).
“We are not into the mass market. This is a community leader’s programme and not a home product.” The cost consideration differed from that of a home-based product, he said. “When the cost factor is considered, java-enabled mobile phones are the best,” he said. The emphasis of the project had been on community involvement with an accent on contingency planning including evacuation preparedness. This could avoid panicking, stampedes, heart-attacks and pre-mature child births likely in such a situation, Prof. Samarajiva said.

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“We are pleased to inform you all that Dialog Telekom launched the Sinhala & Tamil Mobile Browser and their Content Portal “SINHALANTHAYA” during New Year week. The browser can be downloaded by visiting http://www.dialogwap.com using your mobile and going into Application Download Area. This is the 1st ever launch of most successful Unicode compliant browser application. This application runs on wide range of phones starting from entry level low end Java Hand Sets, High End Java Hand Sets, Microsoft Windows Mobile Hand Sets and Black Berries.”

“The most important thing is the content is 100% Unicode Compliant. So people who have been critics of Sinhala Unicode will get another blow as we easily integrate 3rd Party Unicode Content in this platform. You can access Government News content through the browser which is listed under News.”

“At present content portal is updated every day multiple occasions with many interesting content which includes, News, Exchange Rates, Lottery Results to many more. There will be more and more content coming up soon.”

“Download & Enjoy true localized mobile internet! It’s only GPRS charges which applies other than the initial one time nominal download fee.”

What is the number of operators needed in the mobile market to trigger price competition? This question has been posed by regulators and others and there seems to be no definitive answers. What is certain is that by increasing the number of players it becomes harder for operators to collude. In Indonesia, the mobile market is highly concentrated with Telkomsel having more than half the subscriber base and a significantly larger share of revenues. The HHI for Indonesia’s mobile market is 5082, confirming that it is a highly concentrated market.

Hutch is a new entrant with significant experience in other emerging markets and comes in with deep pockets, especially after selling its India stake to Vodafone for more than $11 billion. Hutch is starting with 0 subscribers in Indonesia and is most likely to be the “disruptive” competitor by actively raiding the customer base of existing operators by offering lower prices and innovative service offerings.

Telecoms war hots up as ‘Hutch’ joins the fray

Andi Haswidi, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta April 6, 2007

With the services on offer mostly the same, the tight competition in Indonesia’s crowded wireless telecoms market has led to a no-holds-barred price war and massive ad spending. This month, the war is about to get even fiercer with the established operators set to react to the arrival of upstart Hutchison Charoen Pokphand Telecom (HCPT), dubbed “Hutch” in the business[.. ]

Local calls to other “3″ users cost Rp 150 (1.6 U.S. cent) per minute, while calls to other operators cost Rp 1,000 per minute. The new kid on the block is also running a “buy one, get three” promotion, meaning that if you buy Rp 10,000-worth of prepaid credit, you can make Rp 30,000-worth of calls. This promo means that a one-minute local call only costs Rp 50, which is the same price as a one-minute call from Esia, the CDMA operation of Bakrie Telecom

Telecoms war hots up as ‘Hutch’ joins the fray

Andi Haswidi, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta, April 6, 2007

With the services on offer mostly the same, the tight competition in Indonesia’s crowded wireless telecoms market has led to a no-holds-barred price war and massive ad spending.

This month, the war is about to get even fiercer with the established operators set to react to the arrival of upstart Hutchison Charoen Pokphand Telecom (HCPT), dubbed “Hutch” in the business.

HCPT is a subsidiary of Hong Kong-based global cellular giant Hutchison Telecommunications International (HTIL) and Thai agroindustry group Charoen Pokphand.

Through its GSM-based “3″ brand, HCPT offers wireless access throughout Java, to be followed soon by other areas, with promo tariffs so cheap that they make a mockery of the generally accepted price distinction between GSM and fixed wireless CDMA — CDMA has to date been cheaper due to its coverage limitations.

Local calls to other “3″ users cost Rp 150 (1.6 U.S. cent) per minute, while calls to other operators cost Rp 1,000 per minute.

The new kid on the block is also running a “buy one, get three” promotion, meaning that if you buy Rp 10,000-worth of prepaid credit, you can make Rp 30,000-worth of calls.

This promo means that a one-minute local call only costs Rp 50, which is the same price as a one-minute call from Esia, the CDMA operation of Bakrie Telecom.

Hutchison has also been spending big on advertising, including running full-page color ads in the country’s largest daily, Kompas, every day since the launch of “3″ on March 29.

The other operators have hit back by running similar ads and promos. For example, Indosat’s Mentari is offering a promo price of Rp 50 per 30 seconds until Aug. 31, while Excelcomindo’s XL Bebas is offering a flat rate of Rp 25 per second for all calls, Rp 40,000 in free credit upon SIM card activation, and 50 percent discounts on credit top-ups.

On its initial startup, Hutchison has so far invested $400 million, said president Rajiv Sawney during the launch of 3 on March 29, and said he expected the figure to increase to about $1 billion next year.

“Analysts are predicting some 30 million new subscribers in Indonesia in the coming years. We believe we can secure a good share of that market,” Sawney told the press during the launch ceremony.

At present, Telkomsel leads Indonesia’s mobile market, with some 35 million subscribers, followed by Indosat with 16 million and Excelcomindo with 9 million.

Telkomsel, with its pre-paid product Simpati, charges Rp 1,500 per 30 seconds during peak hours and Rp 300 during off-peak hours, while its other product, As, costs Rp 1,500 per minute during peak hours and Rp 300 per minute during off-peak hours.

For advertising in all media, Telkomsel was the biggest spender in 2005 on Rp 93 billion, followed by Rp 223 billion in 2006, and is expected to fork out even more this year as competition increases, according to a survey by AC Nielsen.

Meanwhile, Indosat’s other GSM product, IM3, costs Rp 500 per 30 seconds for local calls during peak hours and Rp 250 during off-peak hours. Last week, IM3 announced that it would invest up to $1 billion this year.

Following Hutchison’s arrival on Indonesian shores, major Russian conglomerate, Alfa Group, is set to invest up to $2 billion on setting up yet another wireless telecoms operation later this year.

“We see that a lot remains to be done in Indonesia in order to increase mobile penetration. The telecoms market is overly concentrated. There’s not enough competition in that sense, and that severely limits the development of the sector,” said Alfa vice president Andrei Zemnitsky.

The findings of a pilot project on learning how information-communication technologies and community-based training can help in responding to disasters such as tsunamis were discussed by community leaders and international experts at a workshop on “SHARING KNOWLEDGE ON DISASTER WARNING, WITH A FOCUS ON COMMUNITY-BASED LAST–MILE WARNING SYSTEMS” held on March 28^th and 29^th, 2007 at the Sarvodaya headquarters in Moratuwa.

These finding ranged from the difficulties experienced in communicating disaster warnings to villages when mobile GSM and fixed CDMA telecom networks were not functional due to conflict conditions to the importance of not leaving newspapers on top of sensitive electronic equipment which can overheat and shut down as a result. In terms of the five communication technologies that were evaluated across multiple criteria, the addressable satellite radio sets and the java-enabled mobile phones performed the best, with the GSM-based community warning device developed locally by Dialog Telekom, MicroImage and University of Moratuwa following closely. The VSAT based warning system did not perform too well in the tests.

The objective was not to declare a winner among the technologies, but to find out how they could be improved to perform reliably in the difficult conditions of Sri Lankan villages. In disaster warning, great emphasis is placed on redundancy and multiple pathways, so more than one of the technologies will be used when the project moves to the implementation stage. In any case, the findings of the field trials are now in the hands of the developers who are already making improvements to the equipment so that they will perform better not only in Sri Lanka, but in the other countries that are interested in these applications.

Among the significant institutional shortcomings that were identified were the inability of the project to retain all the trainers who were trained last March and the delays in establishing a 24/7 helpdesk function at the Sarvodaya Community Disaster Management Center. As the purpose of a pilot project is to find out what works, what does not work and how things can be made to work better, even the “negative” findings are considered extremely valuable.

The fact that simulations were conducted in all the project districts, except one, was in itself a great success in light of the conflict conditions in the East. A great surprise was how an advanced Sarvodaya village, Mirissa, which was designated as a control village (and therefore not given any equipment) managed to respond extremely quickly to the simulated warning by coordinating with an adjacent village. This was an example of organization and determination trumping technology.

The workshop was attended by experts from South Asia and North America, Last Mile pilot project participants from various villages, Sarvodaya district offices and LIRNEasia; representatives from the telecommunications, satellite and software industries, media professionals, and many people representing groups interested in early warning systems.

Conceptualized in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami that claimed the lives of one out of 500 citizens of Sri Lanka, the Project was generated through the partnership of LIRNEasia and Sarvodaya with their shared objective of evaluating the suitability of information communication technology (ICT) in the last mile of a national disaster warning system for Sri Lanka and with its possible extension to other developing countries. It is funded by the International Development Research Centre of Canada (IDRC) and launched in January 2006.

The pilot project included outfitting and field-testing an initial 32 villages with various kinds of communications equipment which could provide features such as: early warning wake-up, addressability and provision of information in three languages (English, Sinhalese and Tamil). The field-testing actively engaged the 32 villages in assessing and reporting on the effectiveness of the system and equipment being employed. A number of the key hardware and software components were designed and developed in Sri Lanka or specifically for the project.

While effective, economical and appropriate methods of communication and their corresponding ICTs were investigated and employed, the emphasis of the Project was on community involvement with an accent on contingency planning including evacuation preparedness. Part of this process has included training young people from Sarvodaya Shantisena as trainers.

Sarvodaya and LIRNEasia intend to work with their multiple partners to further analyze the finding of the pilot project research and implement them in a broad program to make 1,000 Grama Swarajya villages of the Sarvodaya Movement exemplars of disaster resilience. It is of course hoped that these lessons will be of benefit beyond Sarvodaya villages and indeed beyond the shores of Sri Lanka.

- Implementing CAP in Sri Lanka

- Evaluation of Last-Mile Hazard Warning Information and Communication Technology Hardware and Software System

- Content Standard for Last-Mile Alert and Notification

(Note: Price data is not yet included; will be done as the tariff data is collected)
The Indonesian telecom sector has seen three waves of liberalization.

• 1st Wave: 1991-1996 (Private investment in sector-financial
  crisis)
  Creation of Satelindo, 2nd International service provider in 1993.
  Partial privatization of PT Indosat (65% Govt retains control) in
  1994
  Exclusivity granted to PT Telkom for fixed local 2010 and long distance 2005 before it was partially privatized in 1995 (66% but government retains control).
  GSM licenses provided to Satelindo & Telkomsel subsidiaries of two incumbents in 1994.
  GSM license issued to PT Excelcomindo in 1996, competitive provider with no financial links to government.
  ISP licenses issued
• 2nd Wave of Reforms
  1999-2004 (Post crisis-Change of guard)
  Telecom Act of 1999 separating policy & regulatory functions, allowing increased private participation
  Ending of cross-ownership between government owned telcos
  Premature ending of PT Telkom’s exclusivity
  Creation of duopoly for fixed sector
  Ministerial decree (KM 31/2003) creating BRTIRegulatory Body
  Merger of Satelindo with PT Indosat, Telkomsel with
  PT Telkom
• 3rd Wave of reforms
  2005- present (New government of Yudhoyono)
  Unlicensing of 2.4 GHz
  Licensing of three Fixed Wireless Access (FWA) providers, two incumbent and Esia (Bakrie Group).
  Auction of 5 3G licenses to Telkomsel, Excelcom, Indosat, Hutchinson, Lippo-Maxxis
  Licenses granted to 15 VoIP operators including major operators
  USO fund established (Regulation No. 15) in 2005 where all operators contribute 0.75% of gross revenue.
  Government regulation (GR2/2006) on mandated cost-based interconnection
  Reference Interconnect Offer to be submitted by all operators to
  BRTI, dominant operators’ RIO will be published.
  Tariff regulation for leased lines

What were the drivers of growth?
Initially the government allowed domestic investment. Then the government decided to attract foreign investment via concessions with the promise of reform.
Lorraine Carlos Salazar says: who exactly are these stakeholders who supported entry of FDI in the sector? 
DG: Mastel, the Ministry
Before the Asian Crisis, there was a lot of interest in Eastern Asia, however after the Crisis, much of the Investment dried up. Government was then forced to undergo reform (driving the 2nd wave of reform).
Lorraine Carlos Salazar says: Did the incumbent wanted FDI?
Payal Malik says:  lack of domestic resources were the drivers for the incumbent being open to FDIs, as in the case of Thailand.  They were not averse to FDIs because it went into their own networks and it wasn;t competition
Divakar: Incumbent benefited from the FDI b/c it allowed them profit from the other companies, without risk. Lack of domestic resources were the drivers for FDI
Third wave of reforms driven by the promise by the current government to end corruption. Unlicensing of the 2.4Ghz band was driven by a civil society campaign. Recognition of merits of competition due to the success of the mobile sector) also added to the motivation.
2006 has seen a lot of growth, and investment in infrastructure. E.g no. of base stations has doubled since the start of the year.
absence of interconnection regime led to pvt companies choosing to invest in mobile rather than fixed.
fixed wire-line growth has not changed since 2005; given falling population, fixed teledensity is likely to fall.
PT Telekom’s fixed wireless subscriber has actually dropped – because many signed up for the ‘Flexi’ package for free minutes; once the free minutes were all used up, many discontinued use (and moved to Easia which have very low rates).
Fixed wireless operators are only allowed to operate within certain area codes. To circumvent restricted mobility for the fixed wireless subscriber, operators allow call forwarding and temporary roaming.
While many argue that Java has ‘all the phones’, its teledensity is actually fairly low; the issue is Java has a high population.
The graph on Slide 19 shows Easia’s ARPU increasing (unlike what is normally seen), however the data is being checked.
Easia’s spends a lot on advertising; they are a highly recognized brand.
Payal Malik says: Just for reference, Fixed wireless is not important in India so no separate data on ARPUs
Lorraine Carlos Salazar says: yes, same with Philippines and Thailand I think
In the mobile sector, Telkomsel, Indosat and Excelcomindo are the main players. the other companies are starting up.

Although mobile service is cheaper in Indonesia in absolute terms, it is relatively expensive (relative to monthly GNI).
When mobile market share is calculated as % of sector revenues (as opposed to subscribers), there is a change in the shares. The incumbent has a 68% share, as opposed to 55%. Directionally, the market share doesn’t change, but exact shares do.
Vasana – how practical is it to calculate in this way?
Divakar  – it’s a controversial issue.
Distribution of telecom access (Slide # 27) shows that there are a multiple mobiles within households.
When Indonesia is compared to the other ASEAN countries, its performance is quite poor.
Harsha de Silva: Singapore – Internet penetration is higher than fixed line penetration; why?
Divakar: access is through WiFi (ubiquitous WiFi coverage in Singapore) as well as mobile Internet.
ADSL is almost invisible (Slide 29) b/c the incumbent owns all the infrastructure.
Household PC ownership is low; Internet access via those PCs is EVEN lower.
Telecom regulatory performance:
Lorraine Carlos Salazar says: please clarify– the regulator is separate from the Dept of Telecoms? What does the latter do? still own the former fixed line monopoly is it?
Divakar: Not really separate, b/c of Chairman BRTI is also the Director of Dept of Telecoms.
Most of regulatory activity is done by BRTI.
Not telecom policy to guide the decisions and direction that the ministry is taking. Although the ministry is quite active in making decisions, there is a lack of coherence in the actions / decisions that are being taken.
Lorraine Carlos Salazar says: with regards issuances– are they hiring external consultants? who are writing these issuances?
Divakar: consultants are being hired to do various things; but in terms of writings and decrees, they are competent enough to do these on their own.

Lorraine: Is there really a plan or policy on telecoms lib, which provides guidance on the issuance of licenses? or is to ad hoc and open to  or lobbying, rent-seeking, etc.?
It is actually an opportunity if licenses are given in an ad hoc manner, b/c there is opportunity to illustrate to the Minister where a license will be useful, and there will be a hope that the Minister will give that license.
Rohan: Yes, but there is also another side of ‘ad hoc’ behavior (eg giving a license to your brother)
Divakar: the process is much more transparent now than before, and public consultations are mandatory by law.
TRE assessment:
Mobile sector has scored well on Mkt entry – this is b/c entry has been open; auctions were held as recently as last year. 3G operators are also allowed to provide 2G services
Bottlenecks in the fixed sector cause problems in other sectors, such as banks not being able to have points of presence (via credit card sales points).

None of the fancy equipment and good intentions made a difference last Monday when a 7.7-magnitude undersea quake south of Java triggered a tsunami that smashed into 200 kilometres of coastline around Pangandaran.

What ensued was a scaled-down reprise of December 2004: communities caught by surprise, the death toll mounting as bodies are uncovered and, most regretfully, alarm bells lost in transmission. To be fair, unlike its much bigger but slower rolling predecessor, the Java temblor gave the Indonesian Bureau of Meteorology and Geophysics only 20 minutes to sound an alert.

Even with the best communications, that would not have been long enough to evacuate the shore. Given the fact that most of the fishing villagers did not have TVs or telephones, any rescue plan would have been dead on the water well before it could get off the ground.

Java illustrates the importance of the \”last mile\” in the early warning network. In Thailand, the crucial distance between centralised detection and the often isolated coast is being closed by education and drills.

We will start the event by lighting the traditional oil lamp. Next is a 2 minute meditation.

Nuwan Waidyanatha –

Welcome all partners including, Dr. Gordon Gow (University of Alberta), Dr. Dileeka Dias (Director Dialog Communication Research Lab), Prof Rohan Samarajiva (Director LIRNEasia), Mr. Nanadana Jayasinghe (Director Sarvodaya Disaster Management center), most importantly the Sarvodaya Participants (ICT Guardians).

Rohan Samarajiva –

We started the lat Mile HazInfo Program on January 23, 2006. The objective of my talk is to introduce you to the framework used in this project. The attendees are people who have faced the great tragedy that happened in December 26, 2004. Since then, 20 months later, we still have no solution in our nation.

3 Tsunamis have occurred in the Indian Ocean within the last 20 months. The last tsunami killed over 500 in Indonesia.

We can excuse ourselves for not having a warning system for the 2004 tsunami. But what about the next one? We cannot give excuses any further.

Before we go in to the details I will present the evidence and how is our preparedness– (Associated Press)

- local time 14:19 a Earthquake happens in the Indian Ocean,- PTWC issues a warning 17 minutes later- 39 minutes later first wave hits the coast

- message reads … affective coutries Indonesia and Australia

According to the Associated Press, Indonesia promises to roll out warning system in 2009. Welfare Minister Aburizal Bakrie told Associated press “ we are preparing one, but is not finished”. “After earthquake occurred people ran up hill”, V. President of Indonesia

Warning system links

Link 1 – Issue message to from the detection centers

Link 2 – Warn the Government Officials of threats

Link 3 – Warn first-Responders such as police and local government agents

Link 4 – Warn the last mile

Can we talk in past tense instead of future tense. Two other Nations ARE QUIPED with early warning system. Thailand has built a warning towers on beaches across its southern coast. Malaysia HAS positioned two buoys off its coast and have tested the system.

Now countries that speak in future tense; Sri Lanka has a plan to install a national warning system and information will be passed to villages by phones or national media

Rohan asks questions from the audience …

Do you get warnings through the gov now – audience NO

Do you have sirens in Churches, Mosques, and Temples as the Government has promised – audience NO

“Physical world of hazards, symbolic worlds, link technologies & institutions that work imperfectly.”

The Last-Mile HazInfo project is not a public warning system, it is a closed network alerting system. The Last-Mile project envisions on overcoming the lessons learned from the 2004 tsunami — keep ahead of congestions, address point-to-multiple media

We will provides the knowledge for the last mile to make their own response plans and when they are provided with them risk information. The last-Mile First-Responders will react based on the training and the severity of the hazard information.

We do not tell people to evacuate or take action but we only provide the know how and the information for the last mile to make their own decisions

10 deaths and 5 premature births as a result of inappropriate warning by the government in after the great Nyas earthquake in March. The incident happened at night where a people were sleeping.
Disaster Management is a village level duty. Therefore, we will only provide risk information; but will not ask people to evacuate. Sarvodaya is not authorized to issue public warnings but can develop a good information communication network to provide the necessary Disaster related information for local awareness and response planning.

The last-Mile system overcomes all these problems where a wakeup feature has been introduced. This is to help the Government by preparing the last mile.

First phase will evaluate how the organizational level of the villages and whether training is necessary for such a system.

Ultimate objective is to use the research findings to develop a model to implement an alerting solution in 226 of the Tsunami affected villages as a phase 2 of this project; phase 3 will implement a early warning solution for the 15000 Sarvodaya villages.

Gordon Gow –

Objective is to make everyone comfortable with the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP). Presentation will highlight the most relevant aspects that deal with the LM-HWS project. It is a core function of the project

Several Needs:

• deliver messages to multiple technologies
• Need to ensure accuracy and consistency in the content
• - Need future expansion and interoperability

CAP is a mean to deliver information to a diverse set of technology which will be tested on Addressable Satellite Radio (ASR), Fixed Phones, Mobile Phones, Remote Alarm Device (RAD) and VSATs.

CAP Background

• standardize content of alerts across all hazards and enable multi-media dissemination
• Works started by the Partnership for Public Warning in 2002
• PPW submitted a report to OASIS in 2004 – Version 1.0 in the project we are using Version 1.1 approved in 2005
• XML-based data interchange format being implemented by government and private sector organizations

Why use CAP

• Open source protocol, which means it is free for us to use
• systematic Message Composition
• Multimedia distribution of single message
• Customization and filtering possibility
• Growing international recognition and implementation (e.g. WCATWC)
• Contribution to the evolution of CAP standard itself

All communication systems can be broken into 3 layers –

1. Content Layer: warning messages
2. Applicant Layer: mobile phones (WAP, Java, SMS, CB), telephone, radio (text display, text-to-voice), Internet (pop up display, email, rss)
3. Physical transportation layer (wireless networks and wired networks)

CAP fits in the Application Layer of the communication hierarchy.

A raw CAP message contains the XML tags and is annoying to read (raw software code). A CAP message viewed through a browser still looks very hard to read (raw information only). After applying a style-sheet to the message it can be converted in to a human readable message (clear message).

It very common to use web links in the message to direct readers to additional information such as a map of the effected areas.

A CAP “profile document defines its implementation for the LM-HWS, which is found in the Hazard-Information-Hub (HIH) guidelines; i.e CAP Profile. First-responders must understand certain features of the CAP profile: Alert, Information, resources, Area segments.

The 3 language problem has been solved by using multiple Information blocks; i.e. An Info block for Tamil, Sinhala, and English per message. The priority of the message is based on 3 pieces of the message: Urgency, Severity, Certainty. Urgent messages means that the community must act immediately; high priority implies that the community must be put on stand by; other a low priority message implies that the community must stay vigilant and keep a look out for hazards.

A government warning will be relayed by the HIH over the Sarvodaya network whenever it is issued. HIH will simply copy the government message and past it in the “description” element of the CAP message and set the “Event” as a “government warning”, which is one of the predefined hazard events in CAP.

2004 December 26th

2005 March 28th

2006 July 17th

Three tsunamis within less than two years; and the clueless Indonesian government can’t still get its act together.

And faraway India is supposed to have issued a warning when there was no chance of a tsunami hitting India. CYA bureaucrat, I guess. A different error.

Sri Lanka radios are supposed to have carried the story within about 30 mts. If true, this is very good.

AP Report
Science and Technology Minister Kusmayanto Kadiman said Indonesia received the bulletins 45 minutes before the tsunami hit but did not announce them because they did not want to cause unnecessary alarm.

\”If it (the tsunami) did not occur, what would have happened?\” he told reporters in Jakarta, noting that there was no effective way to spread a warning without a system of sirens or alarms in place.

He said Indonesia now planned to speed up plans for a nationwide warning system.

Indonesia was hardest hit by a 2004 tsunami that killed at least 216,000 people in a dozen Indian Ocean nations _ with more than half the deaths occurring in Sumatra island\’s Aceh province.

Though the country started to install a warning system after that disaster, it is still in the early stages. The government had been planning to extend the alert system to Java _ which was hit by a quake in May that killed more than 5,800 people _ in 2007.

Answering reporters\’ questions as to why no warning was issued on Monday, Vice President Jusuf Kalla claimed there was no need because most people had fled inland after the earthquake, fearing a tsunami.

\”After the quake occurred, people ran to the hills … so in actual fact there was a kind of natural early warning system,\” he said. However, of dozens of people interviewed by The Associated Press in Pangandaran on Tuesday, only one person said he felt a slight tremor. None said there was a mass movement of people to higher ground before the tsunami, though some residents recognized the danger when they saw the wall of water approaching.

The socioeconomic belief is that a CAP message relay is one way of effectively managing disasters, and that is what is envisioned in the Last-Mile Hazard Warning System (LM-HWS) Pilot Project. I will be talking about the current Workpackage of the LM-HWS project, which is developing the Hazard Information Hub (HIH). The general objective of the LM-HWS project is to evaluate the suitability of a selected set of ICT that can communicate CAP messages and alert the village first-responders. The Sarvodaya HIH was specifically built with the intension of providing structured risk information such as CAP messages to the local communities.

The objective of the project is to find optimal ICTs for issuing the last mile warnings in Sri Lanka, which can be extended to other developing countries. It is a community-based last-mile warning system, being tried out in a selection of Sarvodaya’s villages (http://www.sarvodaya.org) in Sri Lanka.

Different technologies will be tested in 32 of Sarvodaya’s Tsunami-affected villages; some are ‘organised,’ some are ‘less organised’ and some have received training, and some have not.

Five kinds of ICTs have been selected in this experiment:

1. Dialog Early Warning Network Remote Alarm Device Dialog Telekom & University of Moratuwa, SL)

2. Sinhala/Tamil SMS with alarm for Java compatible phones (Dialog Telekom & MicroImage)

3. Internet Emergency Public Alerting System (IPAS) with pop-up message (Solana Networks)

4.Disaster Warning Recovery and Response Addressable Satellite Radio (WorldSpace Global Data Solutions)

5. Fixed phone

All of these devices will function if they’re in standby mode when an alert is received. But, sirens will be set off in the case of 1, 2, 3 and 4. Conventional warning relies on TV and radio, which will if switched off, will be of no use.

Sarvodaya has a hazard informaiton hub, where hazard information is collected, and relayed out to the villages.

Common Alerting Protocol, cutting edge software, is being used in the project. By using CAP, large amounts of information can be relayed, in a standardised manner, which can be relayed to the village level.

A key issue is how to make it (CAP) effective , how to make it readble, in Sinhala and Tamil. Have a language tanslator on SAHANA. it makes use of standardised phrases that replace the english text. Once edited, the message has to be relayed. The CAP message can be translated into voice (developing this feature). A configurator informs ‘teleporters’ (e.g Dialog Telekom) which areas to alert.

Info is received from various agents (eg govt). an alert is received, then it is authenticated (with paper trail). CAP message is generated in software at the same time. But only after approval is recieved from Sarvodaya, the message is relayed to the relavant villages. Phone logs can be incorporated for reduncancy.

And now a live demonstration of IPAS by Solana…..

With some intro from Nabil Seddigh, Rupinder Singh, Dr. Gordon Gow and Biswajit Nandy (in Ottawa, via Skype): Solana has carried out field trials for public alerting using Television, the Internet and Telephone Dialers.
Users subscribe to receive certain alerts, they can choose the geographical area for alerts, the alert type (public security, health, etc), and the severity of the alert.

IPAS (internet emergency public alerting system) consists of alert servers (responsible for sending out alerts), public alert client software (resides on computer of end users), public official web portal (to issue alerts) and system admin tools.

This system was trialed three times – first in July 2004, then in November 2004 and finally in February 2005. The key objectives of the trials were to assess technology, to get feedback from public officials, and to get feedback from end users on the usability of the system. Seven Canadian municipalities participated, and included a diverse group of users (students, municipal staff, general public, officials, etc).

By Divakar Goswami & Onno Purbo, March 2006
LIRNEasia’s latest research paper is available for comment. The paper looks at the deployment of Wi-Fi in Indonesia, under the 2005 WDR theme, ‘Diversifying Participation in Network Development.’

Download paper: indonesia wi-fi study 2.0 [PDF]

Please post your comments below.

Executive Summary
With their low-cost and quick deployment time, wireless Internet technologies like Wi-Fi offer last-mile access network solutions to developing countries with limited network infrastructure. Among developing countries, Indonesia is unique for the extent of Wi-Fi that has been deployed by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and private entrepreneurs in more than 40 towns and cities across the archipelagic nation. However, the findings from the current study finds that Wi-Fi “innovations” in Indonesia are not a result of enlightened policy designed to extend communication infrastructure to unserved areas but rather a workaround solution to hostile market and regulatory conditions.

The research objectives were to determine the conditions that gave rise to Wi-Fi becoming an access technology of choice for Indonesian ISPs; the lessons that can be abstracted from Indonesian Wi-Fi innovations; and the steps that must be taken for the next stage of Internet growth in Indonesia. Despite having two regulatory bodies, DG Postel and BRTI, the Indonesian telecommunication sector lacks credible, independent regulation. DG Postel is embedded within the Ministry of Communication & IT and BRTI is nominally independent being understaffed, lacking teeth and being chaired by a DG POSTEL representative. A poor regulatory environment is compounded by a non-competitive telecommunication sector dominated by PT Telkom and Indosat who were given exclusive licenses by the Indonesian government for fixed telephony and international gateways, respectively. In the absence of regulatory requirement to unbundle the local loop, PT Telkom’s monopoly over the last mile facilities that are critical to all local telecommunications services especially Internet service means that Internet Service Providers (ISPs) needed to build their own last mile infrastructure to reach customers. However, license conditions for Network Service Providers, the category that ISPs fall into, forbid them from building their own infrastructure—last mile or backbone. The ISPs used Wi-Fi in the access network as a workaround solution for their inability to build or buy last-mile infrastructure. Until recently (January 2005), the unlicensed use of 2.4 Ghz for Wi-Fi was illegal and the use of 5.8 Ghz continues to be. However, that has not prevented ISPs from using those parts of the frequency because Wi-Fi is cheaper and easier to deploy compared to wired infrastructure and has lower sunk costs at risk if caught by the authorities.

As is well documented in the literature of economics, monopolists do not invest the full amounts required for economic efficiency when they are provided with monopoly returns on their investments. This is the case in Indonesia with backbone infrastructure that is scarce outside the islands of Java and Sumatra and unevenly deployed even in those two islands. The inadequate supply of backbone and lease line infrastructure and the high monopoly prices for leased lines that exceed benchmark prices in other countries by as much as 48 times, has forced ISPs to use Wi-Fi as low-capacity backhaul networks to carry Internet traffic. These cost saving strategies by ISPs have not been able to keep retail Internet prices from being three or four times the price in benchmarked countries. This has resulted in a multi-tiered retailing of Internet service, where large customers like schools act like ISPs using Wi-Fi to connect to neighbourhood networks, other schools and businesses to recover high Internet costs that can be as much as US$4000 per month for a 2Mb link. It is evident from the research findings that ISPs in Indonesia have used Wi-Fi “innovations” to circumvent market & regulatory barriers. Until credible regulatory reform is carried and the telecom market is liberalized, the gains in the telecom sector generally and Internet specifically will be limited and unsustainable. For quickest results for high Internet growth in Indonesia, the regulator must reduce leased line prices as a number of studies in different countries have shown.

The silver lining for Indonesia is the inherently lower costs of Wi-Fi compared to wired last-mile access technologies, providing the country with potentially explosive Internet growth if conducive regulatory and market conditions are created.

Wi-Fi “Innovation” in Indonesia – Final Report Version 2.0

Wi-Fi “Innovation” in Indonesia – Draft Report Version 1.2