The latest issue features an e-interview with LIRNEasia’s CEO Rohan Samarajiva, but it is not the only reason why we thought of highlighting the issue. The content is interesting and very readable. We publish two e-interviews from July 2010 issue here fully, as they are not available on public domain.

Apart from Samarajiva, This issue carried e-interviews with Alison Gillwald, Indra de Lanerolle, Christoph Stork and Muriuki Mureithi.

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The need for competitive research for policy influence
e-interview with Alison Gillwald

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“High quality, rigorous research…is required to compete and complement with each other for policy influence… In mature economies researchers from multiple universities would be debating and refining the positions governments should be taking on everything from regulating next generation networks to demand stimulation for broadband.”
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Alison Gillwald is Executive Director of RIA. She is also Adjunct Professor at the UCT Graduate School of Business, Management of Infrastructure Reform and Regulation, and a member of CPRafrica’s organisation and selection committee.

CHAKULA: You have just held the CPRafrica conference in Cape Town. What are you hoping to achieve through the conference?

ALISON GILLWALD [AG]: There is almost no scholarly research being undertaken in the field of ICT policy and regulation on the continent. A Google scholar search on the subjects throws up around five scholars on the continent who are published in peer reviewed or accredited journals. It is this kind of high quality, rigorous research that is required to compete and complement with each other for policy influence. In mature economies researchers from multiple universities would be debating and refining the positions governments should be taking on everything from regulating next generation networks to demand stimulation for broadband. Although there are pockets of applied research being undertaken there is no tradition of critical intellectual engagement in this area on the continent. The purpose of CPRafrica is to provide a forum for nurturing and showcasing research in the area of ICT policy and regulation on the continent and enhancing its quality through rigorous academic review and debate. The conference is complemented by a young scholars programme to expose young scholars who may be excluded from such peer-review, paper-acceptance-only style conferences without such a category. Some of these are part of the IDRC- [International Development Research Centre] funded PhD programme to encourage doctoral research in ICT policy and regulation. The idea here is to build a cadre of policy intellectuals on the continent able to critically engage government on the basis of relevant research and contribute meaningfully to research and policy excellence. This will further enhance Africa’s standing in international research and governance fora, in which its participation has historically been suboptimal.

CHAKULA: Reviewing some of the papers presented at the conference, it strikes me that there are a couple of threads that are emerging. Two in particular stand out: the notion of “innovation” in the telecommunications space, and the challenges around convergence and policy when two distinct sectors with different ways of doing things are brought into conflict with each other. I also went back to Research ICT Africa’s 2008 M-banking policy paper, which raises similar themes, and I would like to use that as a starting point. First, on the issue of ‘innovation’. In the M-banking paper, the following assertion is made: “Policy-makers and regulators need to ensure that evolving systems serve the broader objectives of economic growth and development as well as protect consumer interests, while creating an environment that encourages and rewards innovation”. In what ways can policy inhibit or encourage innovation in the telecommunication’s sector?

AG: Indeed, providing certainty to investors and operators while retaining the levels of flexibility to enable innovation in a fast-changing environment is one of the most difficult balancing acts that policy-makers and regulators have to perform. I think the linkages and catalysts between technology, market and regulatory innovation are becoming clearer all the time. New technologies and service offerings have prized open markets and the entry into less policy and regulatory constrained markets has made taking certain technologies to market more viable. This has triggered further possibilities across historically distinct platforms, not only between broadcasting and telecommunications, but between fixed and mobile services and even entirely separate sectors such as telecommunications and banking. The challenges to the expansion of such services are really regulatory now rather than technological – and that is not to say that one does not want or need public interest regulation either in the telecommunications or banking sector, but it has to be done in new, innovative ways that enable to extension of these services to those who currently don’t enjoy them. Once these various forces are unleashed they are able to intersect and create new opportunities and innovative ways of doing things that have not been done before.

CHAKULA: Innovation here seems necessarily to be tied to market gain – the objective is to increase or capture market share. In both your M-banking paper, and the case study of the mobile operator One Network in Kenya, preconditions exists that facilitate innovation. With M-banking there are low-income earners who are ‘unbanked’ and who could benefit from some kind of low-cost transactional instrument, and with One Network, there is a significant level of cross-border traffic that makes a seamless network attractive.
AG: It is true that innovation is often driven by market forces and pursuit of profits, and, traditionally, with new technologies have focused on high-end markets. But much of the ICT innovation we are witnessing in developing markets is focused on what has been referred to as the ‘gold at the bottom of the pyramid’ – very profitable turn-over of high volumes of sometimes minuscule margins on products that, by breaking them up or making them available at cost, the masses at the bottom of the economic and social pyramid can enjoy things like pre-paid phone vouchers, or transferable airtime vouchers. And many of these products have been commercialised innovative practices by the poor in order to access and affordably use communications services – such as missed calls, multiple sim card usage that allows for same net rates, or ‘plastic roaming’.

CHAKULA: If we consider Indra de Lanerolle’s fascinating case study on the South African convergence scenario, we see two sectors (broadcast and telecommunications) in conflict with each other because policy decisions are made according to different frameworks: simply put, economic versus public interest. In fact, Indra does seem to suggest that these are in competition with each other, and resolves this in an interesting way. It feels hard to believe that ‘consumer interest’ is the same as ‘public interest’?

AG: I think with the shift from public utilities to competitive markets many of the public interest objectives of delivery and service are met through serving the consumer interest. Nevertheless there is public interest regulation that is required to improve wider and collective consumer welfare – to provide access to ‘uneconomic areas’ for example – though with new more cost-effective, rapidly deployable wireless services, this concept in markets that enable competitive entry is regularly not proving to be the case. But as long as we have the large number of poor that we do, we will need some level of social regulation – even though a lot of the current pent-up demand could be met with greater market efficiency (more competitive markets offering better prices). And then there are the more traditional content regulation issues either to restrict certain ‘harmful’ content or activities or to enable it, such as local content regulation. That too may be found to be highly profitable, but may need either protection or encouragement.

CHAKULA: Indra’s paper, like your M-banking policy paper, shows that regulating convergence is tricky because of the ‘convergence’ of two or even more sectors; whether broadcast/telecommunications or telecommunications/banking etc. What are some of the key challenges that policy-makers can expect to face in Africa?

AG: The key challenge for African regulators is that they are still trying to deal with legacy regulation around first and second-generation infrastructure and access. At the same time, if they do not want the agenda to be set for them in international fora, they need to deal with next-generation issues, not only of converged IP [internet protocol] networks and services and the next-generation regulation issues of network and service-neutral regimes, but of cross-cutting issues of electronic commerce frameworks, intellectual copyright rights, security and privacy issues, and so on. And you have to do it all or be left behind…

CHAKULA: One frustration is that when one reads a good paper that seems to offer a solution to a problem, one is also met with the feeling that those with decision-making powers are probably not going to read that paper, or seriously consider its arguments. Do you feel the same? If so, how do you think CPRafrica picks up on this challenge? Is it just a case of repeating issues until policy-makers take them on board?

AG: No. CPRafrica is one of several strategic strands towards having evidence-based ICT policy on the continent. This is about organic and indigenous knowledge creation and contribution, at the national level, at the level of regional association and continentally, and also about global engagement and influence. For too long have the solutions come from the developed world. Of course, there are lessons to be learnt and we don’t need to reinvent the wheel, but we also have different challenges and Africa has demonstrated remarkably innovative responses to these when they are informed by sound policy, effective regulation or thorough and appropriate business plans. The indicator research done by RIA and its analysis in order to assess policy and regulatory outcomes is fed into several initiatives, globally and locally. RIA provides the only comprehensive public domain demand-side data on ICT access and usage on the continent. This is used in national, regional and continental meetings on ICTs, and in the database and reports of multilateral agencies such as the OECD and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), to better inform their understanding of developments in Africa. It is true that sometime decision-makers do not like to hear of the widespread policy and institutional failure on the continent, but many do – especially those that are rapidly improving and beginning to see the rewards of their reforms. This research is also used to develop training curricula that address the needs of policy and regulators in a developing country context. So, for example, as part of the global research and training collaborative LIRNE.net we conduct a professional development course on alternative regulatory strategies at the UCT Graduate School of Business Infrastructure Reform and Regulation Programme to build institutional capacity on the continent. So CPRafrica is just one arm of a multi-pronged strategy of research and education, institutional capacity building and technical assistance and dissemination and advocacy, through our website database, policy papers and workshop and public presentations.

CHAKULA: What is the way forward for the conference? Will there be more?

AG: Yes, in order to build and sustain this much-needed capacity we will have to find a way for CPRafrica to become an annual institution.

Related links:

M-Banking the Unbanked: RIA Policy Paper No. 4:

http://www.researchictafrica.net/new/images/uploads/RIA_Mobile-banking.pdf

CPRafrica conference details: http://www.researchictafrica.net/index.php/news/38-cprafrica-looking-back-at-a-decade-of-communications-reform-looking-forward-to-2020
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Innovation through competition: the budget telecom network model
e-interview with Rohan Samarajiva

Paper link: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1564529

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“The status quo must be unbearable.”
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Rohan Samarajiva is the Chair and CEO of Lirnasia. His paper, “How the developing world may participate in the global Internet Economy: Innovation driven by competition” was presented at a workshop organised by the OECD and InfoDev in Paris, 10-11 September 2009.

CHAKULA: In your paper, you talk about the Budget Telecom Network Model (BTNM), which is brought about by competition allowing operators to reduce the transaction costs of low-end clients. This, as you point out, is different to the standard Average Revenue Per User (ARPU) model. How does it make the ARPU model redundant?

Rohan Samarajiva [RS]: ARPU is a short-hand that outside observers use to see if the firm is doing well, whether its prospects are good, etc. It is, like any indicator, imperfect. You get it by taking total revenue (preferably without extras like roaming) and dividing by number of subscribers. Of course no one really knows what a subscriber is any more, with even poor people holding up to five SIMs, foreigners having SIMs, no agreement on what an active SIM is and so on. You can get better results by looking at revenue per minute. Take total revenue (less roaming and other stuff) and divide by Average Minutes of Usage per User per Month (MOU). This is a better indicator. But investment analysts are still not used to this and it would require disclosing MOUs to calculate.

CHAKULA: Can ARPU be used as a business model?

[RS]: Operators do not actually do much with the ARPU. It is not a business model as such, just an indicator. But getting more from each subscriber (if this is known) is not a bad idea. Just that it does not predict whether the company will make money or not. The best indicator for that is EBITDA [Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization] margin. Sri Lanka in 2007 had an operator with LKR311 (approximately USD3 at the time) ARPU making close to 50% EBITDA margin. In the end, the success of a business model lies in whether it generates profit.

CHAKULA: What is your understanding of ‘innovation’ in the telecommunications space? You talk of “business innovation”, rather than, say, technological innovation?

[RS]: Tech innovation is important, but it is not the only thing. Pure tech innovation is done by manufacturers of network equipment and handsets. That is good. Business process innovations (e.g. lowering the costs of base stations through software) are done by operators. These include technical aspects, but are not limited to them. Shifting from one business model to another (discovering the latter) is also innovation, but it may or may not not have a tech aspect at all.

CHAKULA: What are the preconditions for innovation, do you think?

[RS]: The status quo must be unbearable. The BTNM innovation occurred when competition got so intense that there was no way to gain market share or even survive without doing something new.

CHAKULA: Does BTNM have implications for increased access to broadband internet for the majority of people on a continent like Africa?

[RS]: Yes. The latter part of the paper is entirely on the extension of BTNM to broadband. Some headlines are that operators must have enough money from voice that can be invested in the 3G plus networks. Once the overlay network is built out the operators have to offer low prices. Prepaid sachet pricing is best, where one buys packages of connectivity in minutes or in capacity. Here, because of lower transaction costs and prices there should be an influx of new customers. This is already on offer in Asia. Africa has to lower prices. Access will be over mobile networks, using dongles or built in modems, for laptops and other devices, including phones. ADSL will be a niche product. Wireless access is the future.

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Recent International Telecommunication Union (ITU) data reveals that the success of India’s telecom revolution is restricted to mobile voice with very little to showcase in fixed line and internet access, or high-speed broadband. For a country that is the global IT and ITeS capital or the world’s back office, its own internet penetration remains one of the lowest in the world. Forecasts are equally uninspiring, projecting high-speed internet access to remain abysmal till 2012.

Internet broadband penetration will limp along to eventually reach a measly 3.9 connections for every 100 citizens by 2012. Even though internet users may be multiple times higher, actual broadband penetration will not exceed 18.1 million at the beginning of the next decade. In contrast, mobile telephony will add as many as 350 million subscribers during this five-year period to end at roughly 615 million by mid 2012.

These forecasts fall short of the government’s conservative target of 20 million high-speed internet subscribers by 2010-end. India’s broadband penetration is roughly 4.5 million subscribers. Even with a 300% growth rate over the next five years, the sector will fall short of the 50 million mark by 2012.

Read the full story in The Times of India here.

However, while Bangladesh’s policy is designed to attract fresh competition by keeping its existing operators and their shareholders (foreign and Bangladeshi) out of the spectrum bids, India has opted for a different route.

India has restricted BWA bidding to only those who either hold an ISP or a unified access service (UAS) licence, thereby either forcing companies to acquire ISP/UAS licenses before the bidding or keeping away new entrants who are unable to acquire such licences due to price or time constraints.

“Other contrasts are equally striking and show up uncomfortable flaws with India’s auction guidelines,” says a telecom analyst. While India’s BWA guidelines are just four pages, Bangladesh’s is a 57-page invitation for applications for grant of licence. This includes a 30-page licence agreement and detailed terms of interconnection/tariffs.

Read the full story in The Times of India here.

LIRNEasia saw BTRC’s move to issue three new Broadband Wireless Access (BWA) licenses a positive development, as Bangladesh is certainly not a country that can boast of quality and affordable broadband.

This is what we learnt from our research:

Exceptionally high cost of broadband remains a key barrier that prevents the development of the BPO industry in Bangladesh. This is apparent when the prices are compared with similar packages offered by the operators in neighbouring countries. The annual cost of the basic office broadband package offered by Grameen Cybernet Ltd is USD 8,016. This is more than thirty times when compared with the equivalent in India (and 67 times that of EU average). These prices indicate a serious mismatch between demand and supply. So opening the market for broadband services is commendable, but the true impact will be felt only if this results in significant drop in prices.

We are glad to find our trademark in multiple places in the RFP document, specifically in following imrpovements (from the earlier one):

1. Operators should now guarantee QoS not just in last mile, but at least till the first foreign entry point, by purchasing adequate international bandwidth. (Earlier the focus was only on last mile.)

2. Contention ratios and download/upload speed ratios are defined, ensuring capacity increase parallel to the number of subscribers

3. Connectivity need not be confined to WiMax (except in Dhaka and Chittagong Metropolitan area). Operators have the flexibility in using other media (eg Fiber or Copper wires) in conjunction

4. Operators have to ensure QoS as per BTRC guidelines. There will be regular monitoring. (Glad to learn that BTRC will an eye on broadband QoSE! Not many regulators have!)

5. Operators now have a better understanding on backbone/backhaul design. The system can be point-to-multipoint or mesh radio systems consisting of BWA distribution hub stations and their associated subscriber stations (or BWA access devices).

Our complete response is here.

With this, is it too much to expect the same reaction from Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Sri Lanka too for our response on the ‘Planning and Implementation of a National Backbone Network (NBN)’?

“We have been warning for several years that commercial WiFi hotspots, especially in hotels and conference centres, are in danger of pricing themselves out of the market,” says World Wide Worx MD Arthur Goldstuck, who led the research. “And, now that a monthly subscription to a basic 3G service is cheaper than a few hours on most commercial hotspots, the chickens have come home to roost.” Raed more.

The LTE / SAE (Long Term Evolution/System Architecture Evolution) Trial Initiative (LSTI) launched in May this year has reported the successful delivery of the first in a series of test results aimed at proving the potential and benefits of LTE, which is being standardized by the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) as a next generation mobile broadband technology.

The Initiative was founded by leading telecommunications companies Alcatel-Lucent, Ericsson, France Telecom/Orange, Nokia, Nokia Siemens Networks, Nortel, T-Mobile and Vodafone, and was recently expanded with China Mobile, Huawei, LG Electronics, NTT DoCoMo, Samsung, Signalion, Telecom Italia and ZTE joining as new members.

As mobile devices become increasingly sophisticated and handle more and more complex multimedia applications, the LTE/SAE technology is designed to give end users wireless access to growing levels of data throughput on the move.3GPP LTE is specified to enable downlink/uplink peak data rates above 100/50 Mbps in initial deployment configurations.

Read the full story in http://www.3g.co.uk/PR/Nov2007/5407.htm

What is the number of operators needed in the mobile market to trigger price competition? This question has been posed by regulators and others and there seems to be no definitive answers. What is certain is that by increasing the number of players it becomes harder for operators to collude. In Indonesia, the mobile market is highly concentrated with Telkomsel having more than half the subscriber base and a significantly larger share of revenues. The HHI for Indonesia’s mobile market is 5082, confirming that it is a highly concentrated market.

Hutch is a new entrant with significant experience in other emerging markets and comes in with deep pockets, especially after selling its India stake to Vodafone for more than $11 billion. Hutch is starting with 0 subscribers in Indonesia and is most likely to be the “disruptive” competitor by actively raiding the customer base of existing operators by offering lower prices and innovative service offerings.

Telecoms war hots up as ‘Hutch’ joins the fray

Andi Haswidi, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta April 6, 2007

With the services on offer mostly the same, the tight competition in Indonesia’s crowded wireless telecoms market has led to a no-holds-barred price war and massive ad spending. This month, the war is about to get even fiercer with the established operators set to react to the arrival of upstart Hutchison Charoen Pokphand Telecom (HCPT), dubbed “Hutch” in the business[.. ]

Local calls to other “3″ users cost Rp 150 (1.6 U.S. cent) per minute, while calls to other operators cost Rp 1,000 per minute. The new kid on the block is also running a “buy one, get three” promotion, meaning that if you buy Rp 10,000-worth of prepaid credit, you can make Rp 30,000-worth of calls. This promo means that a one-minute local call only costs Rp 50, which is the same price as a one-minute call from Esia, the CDMA operation of Bakrie Telecom

Telecoms war hots up as ‘Hutch’ joins the fray

Andi Haswidi, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta, April 6, 2007

With the services on offer mostly the same, the tight competition in Indonesia’s crowded wireless telecoms market has led to a no-holds-barred price war and massive ad spending.

This month, the war is about to get even fiercer with the established operators set to react to the arrival of upstart Hutchison Charoen Pokphand Telecom (HCPT), dubbed “Hutch” in the business.

HCPT is a subsidiary of Hong Kong-based global cellular giant Hutchison Telecommunications International (HTIL) and Thai agroindustry group Charoen Pokphand.

Through its GSM-based “3″ brand, HCPT offers wireless access throughout Java, to be followed soon by other areas, with promo tariffs so cheap that they make a mockery of the generally accepted price distinction between GSM and fixed wireless CDMA — CDMA has to date been cheaper due to its coverage limitations.

Local calls to other “3″ users cost Rp 150 (1.6 U.S. cent) per minute, while calls to other operators cost Rp 1,000 per minute.

The new kid on the block is also running a “buy one, get three” promotion, meaning that if you buy Rp 10,000-worth of prepaid credit, you can make Rp 30,000-worth of calls.

This promo means that a one-minute local call only costs Rp 50, which is the same price as a one-minute call from Esia, the CDMA operation of Bakrie Telecom.

Hutchison has also been spending big on advertising, including running full-page color ads in the country’s largest daily, Kompas, every day since the launch of “3″ on March 29.

The other operators have hit back by running similar ads and promos. For example, Indosat’s Mentari is offering a promo price of Rp 50 per 30 seconds until Aug. 31, while Excelcomindo’s XL Bebas is offering a flat rate of Rp 25 per second for all calls, Rp 40,000 in free credit upon SIM card activation, and 50 percent discounts on credit top-ups.

On its initial startup, Hutchison has so far invested $400 million, said president Rajiv Sawney during the launch of 3 on March 29, and said he expected the figure to increase to about $1 billion next year.

“Analysts are predicting some 30 million new subscribers in Indonesia in the coming years. We believe we can secure a good share of that market,” Sawney told the press during the launch ceremony.

At present, Telkomsel leads Indonesia’s mobile market, with some 35 million subscribers, followed by Indosat with 16 million and Excelcomindo with 9 million.

Telkomsel, with its pre-paid product Simpati, charges Rp 1,500 per 30 seconds during peak hours and Rp 300 during off-peak hours, while its other product, As, costs Rp 1,500 per minute during peak hours and Rp 300 per minute during off-peak hours.

For advertising in all media, Telkomsel was the biggest spender in 2005 on Rp 93 billion, followed by Rp 223 billion in 2006, and is expected to fork out even more this year as competition increases, according to a survey by AC Nielsen.

Meanwhile, Indosat’s other GSM product, IM3, costs Rp 500 per 30 seconds for local calls during peak hours and Rp 250 during off-peak hours. Last week, IM3 announced that it would invest up to $1 billion this year.

Following Hutchison’s arrival on Indonesian shores, major Russian conglomerate, Alfa Group, is set to invest up to $2 billion on setting up yet another wireless telecoms operation later this year.

“We see that a lot remains to be done in Indonesia in order to increase mobile penetration. The telecoms market is overly concentrated. There’s not enough competition in that sense, and that severely limits the development of the sector,” said Alfa vice president Andrei Zemnitsky.

LIRNEasia researcher, Divakar Goswami, was also interviewed. The interview is featured in the online edition here. The interview is in bahasa. The English text of the interview is below:
1. How’s the growth of ICT in Indonesia for along 2006 (as we see from regulations, infrastructure development (hardware and software), human being, ICT industry etc)?

Information and Communication Technology sector (ICT) in Indonesia is one of the most dynamic sectors of the economy contributing most to GDP growth rate (around 16%) than any other sector. The ICT sector in Indonesia is dynamic, growing and profitable. Compared to the past, the regulatory environment is more transparent, pro-market, pro-growth and therefore pro-poor.

ICT Sector

Wherever competition has been introduced, growth has been spectacular; those sectors lacking competition have grown more slowly. Take the example of the mobile sector that has added 6.6 million subscribers during the first half of the year and where operators have aggressively invested in infrastructure. For the year 2006, we may see an investment of more than $2.5 billion dollars made in the mobile infrastructure as the existing operators gear up to face the challenge from Hutch and Maxis who are rapidly rolling out their infrastructure. The mobile operators have been expanding their network at a frenetic pace: Since the end of 2005, Telkomsel has increased its number of base stations from 7,741 to 12,156 a growth of 57 percent; Excelcomindo’s base stations during that same period have grown from 3,620 to 6,052, a growth of 67 percent. Despite making substantial investments, mobile companies continue to be profitable. Excelcom and Bakrie Telecom that had losses in 2005 have made profits this year.

The fixed sector’s performance on the other hand is poor. The growth of fixed line phones per 100 inhabitants will probably be negative this year as the number of fixed phones remain stagnant and the population increases. Because of Telkom’s de facto monopoly in the fixed line market it is unlikely that the company has any incentives to invest in this sector and nor can investment come in from other operators if the sector is not fully opened up to competition.

Many have argued that why bother with fixed if mobile is doing so well. Since most of Internet service provision is currently relying on fixed infrastructure, the lack of fixed line growth means that there is also no growth in Internet subscribers. According to BPS’ survey from 2005, there are an estimated 10.3 million Internet users who access the Internet from home, office, warnets etc. For a country of 222 million that is less than 0.05 percent of the total population that use the Internet. If one looks at Telkom’s broadband subscribers, it stands at a pathetic 35,000. What are the reasons for this and how can we bridge this digital divide?

The significant cost components of an Internet Service Provider (ISP) in Indonesia are its leased line and international bandwidth costs. As my WiFi study on Indonesia (available on www.lirneasia.net/projects) has shown, leased line prices in Indonesia are around 48 time the price in India for a comparable link. International bandwidth costs are also a couple of times higher compared to countries in the region. Both the domestic and international leased lines have limited competition and hence the prices tend to be high. This translates to nearly $4000 in monthly leased line and internet connectivity costs (512 Kbps) for an ISP. Taking into consideration the average income of an Indonesian, it is astronomical sum! No wonder Internet access in Indonesia is unaffordable to the vast majority and will continue to be so unless competition is introduced in the “big pipes”—in the domestic and international backbone infrastructure markets.

Broadband penetration will continue to be low as long as there is only one provider of ADSL. Hopefully, in the future, competition from wireless broadband providers will lower the prices and make it more affordable for Indonesian people.

ICT Regulation

The Ministry and BRTI have undertaken a number of pro-growth initiatives in the last year or two. It has successfully conducted 3G auction that has been widely perceived as the most transparent licensing in Indonesia’s history. Two new mobile operators have been introduced and the increased competition will hopefully drive down mobile retail prices and make them more affordable for those in the “bottom of the pyramid.” A new cost-based interconnection regime has been introduced, which mandates cost-oriented interconnection and provides enforcement “teeth” to the regulators. When implemented from 2007, it will hopefully promote fixed-line competition and ensure greater transparency in this contentious area.

BRTI’s regulation to implement a phased reduction of leased line prices based on cost calculations may help lower Internet retail prices and help diffusion of Internet connectivity.

However, there are a number of regulatory barriers that are preventing faster growth of the sector. Indonesia has an archaic licensing framework that may have been relevant 10 years ago, but not anymore. Converged services where voice, data, video may be combined blurs the boundary between traditional fixed and mobile services. Indonesia’s regulatory environment is simply not relevant to converged IP-based networks like the New Generation Network (NGN) that are being ushered in all across the globe. The current licensing framework is not technology neutral and has different rules and licensing requirements based on a particular technology. This has resulted, for example, in a situation where the regulator is trying to prevent Bakrie Telecom and Telkom Flexi from providing full mobility services because their license treats them as fixed operators although the CDMA technology can be used to provide full mobile services that will significantly enhance the utility of the service to customers.

Why Bakrie Telecom is licensed to provide service in only two regions is beyond my understanding. When a country does not have enough telecom infrastructure I would think it is in the interest of the Government and the public if an operator is allowed to build a network throughout the country. There are many other serious problems with the licensing framework which I will not get into, but this by far remains an area where more of the Government’s energies should be focussed.

Most of the operators I have spoken to, with the exception of Telkom, feel that although the current regulatory structure is better than what existed previously, it is still not independent in its decision-making. If you look at the structure of the organization it is apparent that BRTI is embedded within the Government that also controls two of the largest telecom operators in the country, Telkom and Indosat. The credibility of BRTI’s decisions will be considerably enhanced among the operators and other stakeholders if it were reformed and given more independent powers and separated from DGPT. The small degree of independence for BRTI has shown impressive results in terms of investment that has come into the sector. Imagine the investor confidence if a fully independent regulator can be put in place?

2. Is there any progress in 2006 than 2005? If yes, what is the indicator?

The following graph indicates quite clearly the progress of the ICT sector from 2005 till half of 2006:
The number of mobile phones in Indonesia per 100 inhabitants has increased quite significantly from 21.6 in the end of 2005 to 24.32 in the middle of this year. The number will probably go up by the end of the year, although growth from 2005 to 2006 may not be as rapid as from 2004 to 2005. However, with the introduction of Hutch and Maxis in the mobile sector, we should see more rapid growth in the number of mobile subscribers who are added to the network at the end of 2007. More competition in the mobile sector will lower mobile retail prices that are quite high compared to the region and make it more affordable to those on the “bottom of the pyramid.”

Although the penetration of fixed wireless access (FWA: CDMA) seems to grow slowly from 2005 to 2006, it does not reflect the impressive performance of Bakrie Telecom that has grown its network from 0.3 million to 1.3 million in less than a year. The slowing growth of FWA is primarily because Telkom Flexi shed a significant number of non-revenue generating subscribers from its network.

3. If no progress or stagnant, would you please to explain it?

Fixed wireline penetration has been negative because of a lack of competition in that sector. In a country with such low penetration one does not expect to see negative growth rates. Telkom, the monopoly provider, has no incentive to invest in fixed line infrastructure in the absence of competition.

Internet penetration numbers from 2006 are not available although growth in the number of Internet subscribers will continue to remain low because Internet prices remain unaffordable to a vast majority of Indonesian. Furthermore, only 3.74 people out of 100 own a PC in Indonesia. Of those PC owners only 27 percent use their PCs to access the Internet. Low PC ownership and low Internet use even among those who own PCs are also other factors that are contributing to stagnant Internet growth.

4. What do you think about the commitment of Indonesia’s government or Information Communication Department (Depkominfo)?

In view of the past year’s performance, I believe that the Minister Sofyan Djalil is someone who would like to reform the ICT sector and bring more competition to develop ICT infrastructure and lower prices. However, as an outsider, one gets the impression that not everyone in the Depkominfo is on the same page as the Minister. Furthermore, since the Indonesian government is dependent on dividends it receives from Telkom, it is probably hard to take decisions that may affect the profitability of the company. It is therefore crucial to separate the policy and regulatory functions. Let the Depkominfo develop policy and leave the day to day business of regulating the ICT sector to the BRTI.

5. What is the important think in this year that must be done by the government but not yet finished?

The Government has been collecting Universal Service Obligation (USO) funds from operators to roll out basic telephone service to 40,000 villages in Indonesia that do not have any connectivity. A least-cost subsidy auction was supposed to be held this year to disburse the USO funds in a transparent manner. However, a Ministerial decree is awaited to launch this very critical program to extend access to the digital “have-nots.” It is hoped that the auction will be held soon and will be open to all network operators (fixed and mobile).

6. What do you think about Dewan Teknologi Informasi (Information and Technology Council) formed by The President SBY? Are you optimist or pessimist with this council?

The formation of the National Information and Communication Technology Council (NICTC) by the President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, is a very important development for Indonesia’s ICT sector. It signals the recognition at the highest level of government that the ICT sector is important for Indonesia’s development and growth. Since the lapse of the 1999 Blueprint, the ICT sector in Indonesia is rudderless. Although the Government has good intentions, many of the policy/regulatory actions have been taken on an ad hoc basis without the guidance of a coherent vision. So a number of decrees have been issued that are overlapping and licensing is being done on an ad hoc basis. For infrastructure sectors with high sunk costs and long gestation periods, like for telecoms, there must be continuity and coherence in the Government’s policies.

Clear vision informed by the views of the various stakeholders can make the Council a guiding hand that can lead the sector to a higher trajectory of growth. The leadership can remove many hurdles imposed by bureaucracy and narrow vested interests.

The first meeting of the Council will be key in defining the objectives that the Government and other stakeholders aim to achieve for the ICT sector. The success of the Council will depend on it developing a time-bound road map or action plan that lays out what the Government would like to see achieved and in what time frame. When the Technical Coordination meeting is held every three months, they would be in a position to evaluate the implementation of the action plans. The biannual Council meeting led by the President would ideally evaluate progress of the action plans, make changes when required and bring to task parties that are responsible for delays in implementation. If that happens, watch the Indonesian ICT sector take-off like a rocket!

8. According to you, what must they do to make a good ICT implementation? And what improvement we can do next?

Good implementation of ICT projects must take into consideration sustainability of the projects when funding stops. For example, it is laudable that Qualcomm has provided wireless access to high schools in Way Kanan in Lampung and plans to connect 59 villages with “warcells,” cellular kiosks. However, the key to success to these projects is to develop a financially viable model to sustain this initiative when Qualcomm stops funding this program. As Grameen in Bangladesh has shown with the Village Phone Program, it is possible for a company to provide connectivity to rural villages in a profitable manner. Because Grameen is making profits from providing telephone connectivity to villages it is in its own interest to expand the service to more villages and in turn help bridge the digital divide.

(Note: Price data is not yet included; will be done as the tariff data is collected)
The Indonesian telecom sector has seen three waves of liberalization.

• 1st Wave: 1991-1996 (Private investment in sector-financial
  crisis)
  Creation of Satelindo, 2nd International service provider in 1993.
  Partial privatization of PT Indosat (65% Govt retains control) in
  1994
  Exclusivity granted to PT Telkom for fixed local 2010 and long distance 2005 before it was partially privatized in 1995 (66% but government retains control).
  GSM licenses provided to Satelindo & Telkomsel subsidiaries of two incumbents in 1994.
  GSM license issued to PT Excelcomindo in 1996, competitive provider with no financial links to government.
  ISP licenses issued
• 2nd Wave of Reforms
  1999-2004 (Post crisis-Change of guard)
  Telecom Act of 1999 separating policy & regulatory functions, allowing increased private participation
  Ending of cross-ownership between government owned telcos
  Premature ending of PT Telkom’s exclusivity
  Creation of duopoly for fixed sector
  Ministerial decree (KM 31/2003) creating BRTIRegulatory Body
  Merger of Satelindo with PT Indosat, Telkomsel with
  PT Telkom
• 3rd Wave of reforms
  2005- present (New government of Yudhoyono)
  Unlicensing of 2.4 GHz
  Licensing of three Fixed Wireless Access (FWA) providers, two incumbent and Esia (Bakrie Group).
  Auction of 5 3G licenses to Telkomsel, Excelcom, Indosat, Hutchinson, Lippo-Maxxis
  Licenses granted to 15 VoIP operators including major operators
  USO fund established (Regulation No. 15) in 2005 where all operators contribute 0.75% of gross revenue.
  Government regulation (GR2/2006) on mandated cost-based interconnection
  Reference Interconnect Offer to be submitted by all operators to
  BRTI, dominant operators’ RIO will be published.
  Tariff regulation for leased lines

What were the drivers of growth?
Initially the government allowed domestic investment. Then the government decided to attract foreign investment via concessions with the promise of reform.
Lorraine Carlos Salazar says: who exactly are these stakeholders who supported entry of FDI in the sector? 
DG: Mastel, the Ministry
Before the Asian Crisis, there was a lot of interest in Eastern Asia, however after the Crisis, much of the Investment dried up. Government was then forced to undergo reform (driving the 2nd wave of reform).
Lorraine Carlos Salazar says: Did the incumbent wanted FDI?
Payal Malik says:  lack of domestic resources were the drivers for the incumbent being open to FDIs, as in the case of Thailand.  They were not averse to FDIs because it went into their own networks and it wasn;t competition
Divakar: Incumbent benefited from the FDI b/c it allowed them profit from the other companies, without risk. Lack of domestic resources were the drivers for FDI
Third wave of reforms driven by the promise by the current government to end corruption. Unlicensing of the 2.4Ghz band was driven by a civil society campaign. Recognition of merits of competition due to the success of the mobile sector) also added to the motivation.
2006 has seen a lot of growth, and investment in infrastructure. E.g no. of base stations has doubled since the start of the year.
absence of interconnection regime led to pvt companies choosing to invest in mobile rather than fixed.
fixed wire-line growth has not changed since 2005; given falling population, fixed teledensity is likely to fall.
PT Telekom’s fixed wireless subscriber has actually dropped – because many signed up for the ‘Flexi’ package for free minutes; once the free minutes were all used up, many discontinued use (and moved to Easia which have very low rates).
Fixed wireless operators are only allowed to operate within certain area codes. To circumvent restricted mobility for the fixed wireless subscriber, operators allow call forwarding and temporary roaming.
While many argue that Java has ‘all the phones’, its teledensity is actually fairly low; the issue is Java has a high population.
The graph on Slide 19 shows Easia’s ARPU increasing (unlike what is normally seen), however the data is being checked.
Easia’s spends a lot on advertising; they are a highly recognized brand.
Payal Malik says: Just for reference, Fixed wireless is not important in India so no separate data on ARPUs
Lorraine Carlos Salazar says: yes, same with Philippines and Thailand I think
In the mobile sector, Telkomsel, Indosat and Excelcomindo are the main players. the other companies are starting up.

Although mobile service is cheaper in Indonesia in absolute terms, it is relatively expensive (relative to monthly GNI).
When mobile market share is calculated as % of sector revenues (as opposed to subscribers), there is a change in the shares. The incumbent has a 68% share, as opposed to 55%. Directionally, the market share doesn’t change, but exact shares do.
Vasana – how practical is it to calculate in this way?
Divakar  – it’s a controversial issue.
Distribution of telecom access (Slide # 27) shows that there are a multiple mobiles within households.
When Indonesia is compared to the other ASEAN countries, its performance is quite poor.
Harsha de Silva: Singapore – Internet penetration is higher than fixed line penetration; why?
Divakar: access is through WiFi (ubiquitous WiFi coverage in Singapore) as well as mobile Internet.
ADSL is almost invisible (Slide 29) b/c the incumbent owns all the infrastructure.
Household PC ownership is low; Internet access via those PCs is EVEN lower.
Telecom regulatory performance:
Lorraine Carlos Salazar says: please clarify– the regulator is separate from the Dept of Telecoms? What does the latter do? still own the former fixed line monopoly is it?
Divakar: Not really separate, b/c of Chairman BRTI is also the Director of Dept of Telecoms.
Most of regulatory activity is done by BRTI.
Not telecom policy to guide the decisions and direction that the ministry is taking. Although the ministry is quite active in making decisions, there is a lack of coherence in the actions / decisions that are being taken.
Lorraine Carlos Salazar says: with regards issuances– are they hiring external consultants? who are writing these issuances?
Divakar: consultants are being hired to do various things; but in terms of writings and decrees, they are competent enough to do these on their own.

Lorraine: Is there really a plan or policy on telecoms lib, which provides guidance on the issuance of licenses? or is to ad hoc and open to  or lobbying, rent-seeking, etc.?
It is actually an opportunity if licenses are given in an ad hoc manner, b/c there is opportunity to illustrate to the Minister where a license will be useful, and there will be a hope that the Minister will give that license.
Rohan: Yes, but there is also another side of ‘ad hoc’ behavior (eg giving a license to your brother)
Divakar: the process is much more transparent now than before, and public consultations are mandatory by law.
TRE assessment:
Mobile sector has scored well on Mkt entry – this is b/c entry has been open; auctions were held as recently as last year. 3G operators are also allowed to provide 2G services
Bottlenecks in the fixed sector cause problems in other sectors, such as banks not being able to have points of presence (via credit card sales points).

The project is the largest of a new breed of wireless networks being built across the country. They are taking advantage of the falling cost of providing high-speed Internet access over radio waves as opposed to cable or telephone lines.

The project will cover 1,500 square miles in 38 cities in San Mateo, Santa Clara, Alameda and Santa Cruz Counties, an area of 2.4 million residents. Its builders, going by the name Silicon Valley Metro Connect, said the service would provide free basic wireless access at speeds up to 1 megabit a second — which is roughly comparable to broadband speeds by telephone — in outdoor areas. Special equipment, costing $80 to $120, will be needed to bolster the signal enough to bring it inside homes or offices.

Full story.

By JOHN MARKOFF,
SAN FRANCISCO,

In an effort to create a global wireless alternative to cable and telephone Internet service, Intel said on Monday that it would collaborate with Clearwire, a wireless broadband company, in developing and deploying the new technology. The companies said that Intel would make a "significant” investment in Clearwire, which has begun building long-range wireless data networks around the world. Clearwire, founded by Craig O. McCaw, a pioneer of the cellular industry, said in August that it had raised $160 million from 23 investors in a private stock transaction. The companies are betting that a new wireless technology called WiMax – which is intended to extend the reach of Wi-Fi wireless networks by permitting a single transceiver to connect hundreds or thousands of customers to the Internet over distances of many miles – will succeed where other long-range wireless data technologies have failed in the past.

Intel is spending $150 million to jumpstart WiMax technology by creating a series of new chips designed to support the WiMax standard. Clearwire recently began offering wireless Internet service in Jacksonville, Fla., for about $25 a month.

During a news conference on Monday, Mr. McCaw said that Clearwire was moving more quickly to deploy the service in major cities in Canada and Mexico and that it was also active in developing countries like Bangladesh. The company said that it could be in as many as 20 American markets next year, but Mr. McCaw said getting access to radio spectrum was more difficult in this country than in Canada and Mexico. He also said that Clearwire could succeed at offering high-speed wireless Internet access where others have failed, in part because it hoped to take advantage of Intel’s efforts to create a global technology standard. "We are tempered by the fact that everyone who has tried this has failed," Mr. McCaw said, "but we’re crossing the river on the backs of pioneers." During the 1990′s there were a number of efforts to provide Internet access wirelessly both in urban and rural areas in the United States, but they have all failed financially. Intel executives said on Monday that they believed that by creating a single global standard for WiMax technology, wireless access could become an alternative to digital subscriber lines and cable.

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/26/technology/26intel.html?ex=1099786570&ei=1&en=b1f3317f6ee75a58

However, he emphasized that ICTs must drop in cost for the investments of the 1990s to bear fruit. “I’m involved in nanotech and biotech, and fairly rapid diffusion of this technology will be very important.”

Although mobile and wireless access are expanding, fixed line and Internet access lag – and the differences are largely due to regulation.

The future may be wireless broadband, but for the foreseable future the policy is fixed line.

Dr. Michael Spence

Dr. Spence began by telling his economic perspective on the importance of good governance. “There’s a lot of talk about how all you need is a market system and that’s just nonsense. Anyone who’s studied information flows in an economy knows that good governance is the foundation of the market system. As an example, a country that doesn’t have a central bank that can control interest rates, etc is a country that’s in trouble. Everyone knows the consequences of a weak central bank, what we need to do is let people know that there are consequences to having instability in the ICT sector.

On What’s Important

On data: A reasonably accurate portrait of the portrait of the state in these dimensions is useful. If you look at the Chinese data, you can debate if the growth is exaggerated, but the data is there and it’s clear.

Foriegn Investment: Creating appropriate conditions for. Competition is the best way since it assures that pricing is appropriate.

Internet: I would not like to see the Internet set aside in favor of ‘plumbing’. I would like to see LIRNEasia get Internet and the www talked about and worked on. I didn’t realize this until I was in Cambodia at an cafe, and then’s when I realized that the Internet wasn’t ‘real’ at that speed. The right answer seems to be high speed connections to hubs where the Internet is real.

We do this in part to reduce volatility and encourage investment. We need to do stuff that is unpopular. The regulator also serves as someone the politicians can point to and say ‘it’s not my fault’.

Finally, let me just say that the network based information technology we’re now seeing develop is in economic terms lowering transaction costs all over the place

It’s absolutely crucial that we not end up in a situation where those powerful forces are at play in one part of the world and not the other.

It’s impossible to not get discouraged about success, but there’s no other way to do it. (This is said with a smile. It was encouraging)