

Assessing the Telecom Regulatory & Policy Environment in 8 Emerging Asian Economies

Manila, 3 Feb 2009



Risk and investment in telecom

- Investment: the necessary condition for telecom sector performance
- Risk: primary decider of investment
 - Higher the risk, higher the rate of return expected by regulators
- Broadly, 3 types of risks
 - Macro Level/Country risks: political stability, exchange rates etc.
 - Market Risks: actions of competitors, availability of substitutable products, cost of capital to firm
 - Regulatory risks : emanating from government, including but not limited to actions (or inactions) of the regulator

Measuring/Quantifying Risk

- Macro Level/Country Risks
 - Not easily quantified
 - But comparative measures possible – e.g. Investment climate survey (WEF), Corruption Index (WB), etc.
- Market Risk
 - Easier to quantify (credit ratings → cost of capital)
- Regulatory Risk
 - Not easily quantified
 - But comparative measures necessary : one investor in multiple countries becoming coming
 - Subjective, but intuitively “known” to stakeholders

TRE: a tool to measure/compare regulatory risk due to policy maker/regulator's actions

- Short questionnaire, takes 5-7 minutes to complete
 - Makes minimal demands on senior level respondents
 - Do not want it filled by assistant
- Asks respondents to evaluate TRE on 7 dimensions

- Market Entry
- Allocation of Scarce Resources
- Interconnection,
- Regulation of Anti-Competitive Practices
- Universal Service Obligations
- Tariff Regulation
- Quality of Service

Directly from
GATS
regulatory
reference
paper

central to regulator's activities

important as markets mature

- Each dimension evaluated on Likert Scale of 1 to 5
 - Minimum 1 = highly ineffective
 - Maximum 5 = highly effective
- 3 (sub) sectors evaluated
 - Fixed
 - Mobile
 - Broadband

3 Respondent categories. Weights to ensure even contribution to final score


- Respondents fall into 3 categories:
 - Category 1: those directly involved in the sector such as operators, equipment vendors
 - Category 2: those indirectly impacted by the sector or those studying/observing the sector with broader interest such as consultants and lawyers
 - Category 3: those who represent the broader public interest such as media personnel, other government officials, retired regulators, civil society organizations
- Each category equally important.
 - But hard to predict number of completed responses in surveys
- Use weights to equalize each categories contribution to final score

A note on comparability

- Comparable countries are needed
 - E.g.: Maldives (microstate) vs. other larger markets
 - Monopoly or duopoly countries (e.g. in Africa, or even Maldives) - no one will comment/express opinions honestly

2008 survey results: winners & losers (best & worst practices)

Market Entry: PK leads with clear (yet expensive) licensing conditions. LK low scores related to delays in AirTel entry into market




PK: Expensive but transparent licensing conditions; no restrictions on foreign ownership

- Clear rules: payment of fee guarantees license renewal
 - Even though very expensive @ USD 291 MM, price at least based on auction value
- Unbundled licensing for fixed
 - investors can enter, offer services in area of their choice
- MNP since 2007
 - even smaller (new entrants) have a fighting chance at capturing market share
- No limitations to foreign ownership, M&A activity
 - USD 1.4 billion in FDI in 2007-2008; accounts for 27% of all of Pakistan's FDI
- Result: 3rd fastest growing Telecom sector. FDI in telecom 27% of PK total FDI

LK: No transparent licensing. No auctions. Not even a competition

- 5th license offered to Bharati Airtel
 - No auction
 - Not even clear if open tender (even if beauty context)
 - Reports of payments
- 21 months to become operational
 - License granted April 2007.
 - Barely operational by Jan 2009
- At the time of survey, even general public expressing concern over Airtel's delays/problems


Allocation of Scarce Resources: PK fast response gives certainty. India's bungles of 3G and 2G spectrum creating negative impact



India: nowhere close to allocating 3G spectrum. 2G players also unhappy

- Spectrum allocated administratively.
- Amount of spectrum linked to subscriber numbers
- Average amount of frequency per operator low
 - World average 17.18 MHz; India 6.2MHz
 - GSM operators loading spectrum well above benchmarks
- Govt, defense sitting on valuable spectrum
- Huge controversies over 3G allocation
 - Battle between existing vs. new players.
 - Headlines in newspapers, letters to PM, DoT etc.
- 2008 TRE scores worse than 2006 even

Interconnection: Thai concessionaires subject to unsustainable IC rules by state operators




Thailand: concession regime staks the cards against non-state-sector operators

- Private concessionaires legally owned by two state operators (TOT & CAT, the only two license holders)
- All interconnection negotiated via TOT/CAT
 - Private operators mere contractors
- E.g. CATs concessionaires (DTAC, True Move)
 - Pay TOT flat fee of USD 5.8 per moth per post-paid SIM
 - Pay TOT 18% of revenue per pre-paid SIM
- Concessionaires refuse to pay TOT since 2006
- Interconnect amongst themselves


India: some of the lowest tariffs in the world.

Regulator does not regulate prices



ID: Operators charged 0.75% of revenues, but funds undisbursed. PK collects 1.75% but has already allocated (to mobile and fixed)

Universal service obligation




ID: Current USO scheme another step in a line of failed policies

- Initially: Force incumbent to invest 20% of revenues in rural connectivity
 - Order not followed by incumbent
- Then: government funds to set up telephone units in ~ 3000 villages using satellite connectivity
 - Only contribute towards achieving 15% of universal service targets
- ...etc...
- Now: all operators pay 0.75% of revenues towards USO fund
 - Collected funds undisbursed (cancelled and halted tenders)
 - Low penetration: 6.5 (fixed) and 35 (mobile) phones per 100 people.

Anti-competitive Practices: everyone scores well below average. General unhappiness by new entrants and incumbents

Regulation of anti-competitive practices




All countries: unhappiness of incumbant legacy and "how" rules are made

- New entrants feel new entrants being favored
 - Or that regulator is not strong enough to order incumbent
- Incumbent feels they are unfairly punished/regulated
- Actual bias/regulatory capture vs. hands being tied due to legacy
 - E.g. incumbent staff working at regulator/policy maker (BD, IN)
 - MV incumbent license expiry creates conditions for opening market, not before
- Many countries lack of separate competition authority
 - Or clear duties when one does exist


QoS: Broadband significantly worse. Mobile better, but operators compromising Quality in going for "budget telecom" model

Quality of Service




International Bandwidth: bottleneck in BB quality, specially with most access content lying overseas


Accessing in-ISP server



Accessing In-Country (domestic) servers




Accessing International Servers



Using TRE scores to track regulatory performance over time

Example: India

India – 64% jump in USO scores from 2006 to 2008. Stakeholders rewarding significant changes in USO policy made during the time.



- Before: only fixed eligible for USO funds
 - Mobile companies paid 5% of revenues to USF
 - Lowest TRE scores in region in 2006
- In March 2007: mobile sector allowed to receive funds
 - Increase in TRE scores
- But still USD 4 billion undisbursed
 - 2nd largest in world
 - TRE scores barely above average

**Real value is using TRE scores to
diagnose a country's regulatory
dimensions**

In depth analysis of the TRE in the Philippines

Dr. Erwin Alampay

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