It is literally a child’s play getting a false UK passport, Frederick Forsyth said in 1972. In his bestselling thriller, The Day of the Jackal the protagonist used the birth certificate of a dead child to obtain a fake passport. Thirty two years later, BBC was not sure the loophole was plugged or not. Not sure how many mercenaries still benefit.
The UK passport cannot be the only document an interested party can manipulate. This issue is particularly interesting to Sri Lankan mobile owners, as the regulator now wants users to prove mobile ownership at omnipresent checkpoints to ensure ‘National Security’
While Tigo will be issuing a loyalty card bundled with an ownership certificate, Dialog GSM today announced a more tech-savvy approach. As claimed by a full page advertisement in Lankadeepa (see above) instead of issuing ‘paper certificates’ Dialog offers a way to check the owner of a phone. Dial #132# and pronto, you get all information needed; customers name, National Identity Card Number, Mobile Number and certificate code.
Great. This is not different from what we suggested earlier. It saves money, time and of course, trees. Use technology to its best. (But please remember to regularly charge your battery. A low battery signal might land you in jail because you are not be unable to prove ownership)
The bigger questions are with the proposed ‘Re-registration’ process. (Though not applicable for everybody) The request by Dialog for customer with ‘incorrect’ information to re-register indicates that their database is incomplete. Isn’t it possible for anyone to manipulate the process? Cannot somebody use a forged NIC to re-register? What guarantee Dialog has that somebody does not re-register a stolen SIM to his/her name because its present customer database is incomplete?
Far bigger questions. Is TRC happy with operators selecting their own modes to comply with its new regulation? Are policemen/women properly instructed about these different modes? Will they insist on certificates when operator does not provide any? Can the police differentiate between a loyalty card (which doubles as a mobile ownership certificate) and any other plastic card (which has the customer name). What guarantee does the TRC have that these certificates cannot be forged, particularly if it is a plastic card with no high security features? (Cannot assume operators want to issue sophisticated cards for millions of customers on their account, for something they do not benefit from)
The fictitious mercenary in Forsyth’s novel was able to reach France on a false passport and almost succeed in assassinating Charles De Gaulle. Agreed, that is fiction. With a system with so many loopholes can the outcome be far different?
6 Comments
Malinthe
This number also works with Mobitel connections. I tried it today.
R. Thirucumaran
Thing is, I’m 17, and do you think Dialog’ll allow me to register the SIM I’m currently using, in my name?
Azit
This is not a proper Security Precautions.
It was reported, My friend’s Mobile checked @ Checkpoint and His Sim wasnot registered for his name.Police REMOVED SIM CARD from phone.Then they gave Sim to him and Phone was arrested by Police.
Rohan Samarajiva
Today’s Sunday Leader carries a story on this subject: http://www.thesundayleader.lk/20080803/Issues-1.htm
kelum
#132# works with tigo, mobitel as well as dialog.
I think this thing is not effective, becaz anyone can hide a sim & use it when they want it, can police find tiny chip!!
The thing is security must be arranged for avoiding threats but it must not damage human rights to communicate…
Ages below 18 can’t have mobile connections with their names.. so parents/ etc.. give sims to them that are not registered t the current users name..
how can they proove this in a checpoint… police will arrest them,,,
their must be a low…… but this is not better enough…
send ur feedbacks… hekelum@gmail.com
Hate Dialog
I hate Dialog they are a bunch of rotters who think they can do anything they want
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