Since Rheingold wrote of Smart Mobs, activists have been atwitter about the potential of mobile phones and texting to effect democratic change. The ongoing struggle against the theocratic dictatorship in Iran has given many examples. But it also shows the limits. When the government shuts down the SMS system, or indeed the whole network, what happens to mobile based organizing? What are the conditions for the government not shutting down networks?
The silent march was a deliberate and striking contrast to the chaos of the past few days, when riot police officers sprayed tear gas and wielded clubs to disperse scattered bands of angry and frightened young people. When the occasional shout or chant went up, the crowd quickly hushed it, and some held up signs with the word silence.
“These people are not seeking a revolution,” said Ali Reza, a young actor in a brown T-shirt who stood for a moment watching on the rally’s sidelines. “We don’t want this regime to fall. We want our votes to be counted, because we want reforms, we want kindness, we want friendship with the world.”
Mr. Moussavi, who had called for the rally on Sunday but never received official permission for it, joined the crowd, as did Mohammad Khatami, the reformist former president. But the crowd was so vast, and communications had been so sporadic — the authorities have cut off phone and text-messaging services repeatedly in recent days — that many marchers seemed unaware they were there.
2 Comments
Rohan Samarajiva
Related discussion that cites this post: http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1267/iran-twitter-revolution
Rohan Samarajiva
Another: http://www.journalism.org/index_report/iran_and_%E2%80%9Ctwitter_revolution%E2%80%9D
Workshop: Digital Tools for Strengthening Public Discourse
Today, LIRNEasia hosted a workshop to launch digital tools created by Watchdog Sri Lanka, funded by GIZ’s Strengthening Social Cohesion and Peace in Sri Lanka (SCOPE) programme. Researchers, practitioners, activists and journalists attended to learn about these tools, and how they can potentially help them in their own lines of work.
Election Misinformation in Sri Lanka: Report Summary
Election misinformation poses a credible threat to Sri Lanka’s democracy. While it is expected that any electorate hardly operates with perfect information, our research finds that the presence of an election misinformation industry in Sri Lanka producing and disseminating viral false assertions has the potential to distort constituents’ information diets and sway their electoral choices.
Election Misinformation in South and South-East Asia: Report Summary
A powerful weapon in a time of global democratic backsliding, election misinformation may undermine democracy via a range of mechanisms. Election misinformation may influence an electorate to cast their ballots for candidates they otherwise might not have on the basis of incorrect information about a country’s economy, the candidates, or some other phenomenon.
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