I can’t recall exactly where (possibly Barcelona where I may have moderated a session she was in), but there was this memory of a conversation with the dynamic Omabola Johnson, about performance contracts that had been entered into by Ministers in her country. It was triggered during a TV talk show last week. Part 2 of show is still not online. As I was working on comments on the Myanmar Communication Regulatory Commission bill (basically embedded in the context of principal-agent theory), it came to mind I should throw out the idea in relation to the difficult principal-agent problem represented by the Sri Lankan Cabinet. So I did: There is precedent.
The legislation creating the Public Utilities Commission and the Telecom Regulatory Commission specifically provide for the regulatory bodies to have their own funds. The Minister of Finance in the 2017 Budget has announced he intends to expropriate the money in the funds and give it out on request. My response in today’s Daily FT: It is customary for independent, sector-specific regulatory agencies to have a separate fund. The agency is operated with fees and other payments from the entities that it regulates that go into this fund. The principal rationale is insulation from pressure that could be exerted by the Government which could use disbursements from the consolidated fund as a carrot or a stick.
It has been an intense and productive two days. There will be more than one set of reflections. This is the first, written from the airport on the way out of Bangkok. We have been worrying about the quality of information supplied to growers and other actors in the supply chains. What if the price information that is supplied is inaccurate, or worse, tampered with by those wishing to corner the market?