Unintended benefits of a conversation with Former Nigerian Minister of Communication Technology

Posted on May 16, 2017  /  0 Comments

I can’t recall exactly where (possibly Barcelona where I may have moderated a session she was in), but there was this memory of a conversation with the dynamic Omabola Johnson, about performance contracts that had been entered into by Ministers in her country.

It was triggered during a TV talk show last week. Part 2 of show is still not online. As I was working on comments on the Myanmar Communication Regulatory Commission bill (basically embedded in the context of principal-agent theory), it came to mind I should throw out the idea in relation to the difficult principal-agent problem represented by the Sri Lankan Cabinet. So I did:

There is precedent. I first heard about it from the Nigerian Minister of Communication Technology. In a conversation about her energetic approach to her subject, she said that she had a performance contract to fulfil. My understanding is that the ministers who were bound by these contracts then turned around and signed contracts with their senior subordinates. Everyone knew what was expected of them and by when. That’s the essence of accountability.

– See more at: http://www.ft.lk/article/615341/An-accountable-Cabinet#sthash.ymfrAMT1.dpuf

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