In an article published on 25 September 2026 in the DailyFT, LIRNEasia Chair Professor Rohan Samarajiva discusses the risks of the state holding large amounts of personally identifiable information (PII). He looks at the misuse of electoral-registry information during the July 1983 pogrom, which critics of public-service digitalisation, particularly the Sri Lanka Unique Identity (SLUDI), cite as a reason for extreme caution, if not halting such initiatives. He argues that the 1983 attacks involved photocopied electoral registers, not digital systems. Therefore, the underlying risk, he explains, is not digitalisation itself. It is the scale of PII held by the state and the potential for it to be misused by insiders, such as government officials with access to the information, or outsiders who obtain copies. 
In an article published on 25 September 2026 in the DailyFT, LIRNEasia Chair Professor Rohan Samarajiva discusses the risks of the state holding large amounts of personally identifiable information (PII). He looks at the misuse of electoral-registry information during the July 1983 pogrom, which critics of public-service digitalisation, particularly the Sri Lanka Unique Identity (SLUDI), cite as a reason for extreme caution, if not halting such initiatives. He argues that the 1983 attacks involved photocopied electoral registers, not digital systems. Therefore, the underlying risk, he explains, is not digitalisation itself. It is the scale of PII held by the state and the potential for it to be misused by insiders, such as government officials with access to the information, or outsiders who obtain copies.